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ABSTRACT 
Service contracting has been adopted in several industries especially for high value assets with long life time. 
Such a contract typically specifies asset usage information, availability or capability of the contracted assets 
required by customers, and the scope of services the manufacturers are obliged to support the assets. 
Consequently, such a contract imposes major risks to the manufacturers. This paper aims to explore approaches 
that be used to assist manufacturers to model service contracts in order to understand the risk and reward prior to 
committing a contract with customer. The work described in the paper involves the development of a simulation 
model from a case of the ship building industry. The use of the model in aiding contracting decisions is 
demonstrated through three experiments conducted at the case company. The outcomes have demonstrated the 
potential of the approaches in practice and contributed to the Product-Service Systems modelling paradigm.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the developed countries are facing ever increasing 
competition from emerging, low cost economies in Asia and eastern Europe. Competing solely on 
cost is no longer an option for these OEMs and even rapid development of technology still makes it 
difficult to sustain competitiveness on product innovation and technological superiority. Along this 
line, many of the OEMs now shift their business strategies and operations to include services. As 
delivery of services is somewhat harder to imitate (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003), integrating services 
to product offerings is perceived to be a new distinctive, long-lived competitive strategy, and is ‘easier 
to defend’ from the lower cost economies (Baines et al, 2009).  
Integrated offerings of product and services can be found in many cases and are usually delivered 
via service contracts, e.g. rental contract, pay-per-use, lease and take back (Lindahl et al, 2009). These 
cases have reported various success stories whereby OEMs were able to avoid unnecessary expenses 
through service contracts. For instance, $1.4 billion were saved over the 30 years of F/A-18 contract 
(Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2006), $53.4 million were saved in the F404 engine PBL agreement (AIA, 
2011), and £510 million expenditure was avoided in a 10-year period ATTAC support contract (BAE 
Systems, 2010).  
Such a contract typically specifies asset usage information, availability or capability of the 
contracted assets, and the scope of services proposed by customers. Based on these customer 
requirements, the OEMs can determine the contract charges. The OEMS are subsequently obliged to 
support the assets as soon as the contracts are signed. 
Although the integrated offering appears to be an attractive solution, Baines et al (2007) reported 
that ‘inexperience in setting up the pricing structure’ is a major pitfall to implementation of service 
contracts and could lead to a catastrophic failure to the whole business. Furthermore, the OEMs need 
to absorb the risks which may include early termination of contract, request for contract renegotiation, 
overuse of asset, excessive demands, market price change and obsolescence, throughout the long-term 
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contract period. Therefore, it is critical that the OEMs are able to assess the impacts prior to 
committing a service contract. Such a tool that enables the OEMs to understand the risks and rewards 
from the service contracts is therefore desirable. 
This paper proposes a simulation approach that can be used to assist OEMs to model service 
contracts in order to understand and have a better visibility of the potential risks and rewards prior to 
committing a contract with their customers. The paper is structured as follows. Following an 
introduction to the context, Section 2 provides more general information of service contracting in a 
product-service business. Section 3 takes the ship building industry as a case study and describes 
service contracts in this context in detail. Section 4 discusses the simulation model followed by the 
experimentation in Section 5. The paper finally concludes with the discussion and some insights for 
future work. 
2 BACKGROUND 
Generally, service contracts in product-service businesses aim to guarantee availability and/or 
capability of assets to the customers. The assets are typically high-tech, high-value, reliability-critical 
that require proper maintenance services throughout their long life time. A contract may have 
different availability (or capability) definitions. The DocuCare service contracts define availability as 
the percentage of photocopier uptime within contracted hours (Xerox, 2010), whereas the Northern 
Line underground service contract in the city of London specifies availability as available trains in the 
morning (Harding and Watts, 2000). The actual level of availability (or capability) is monitored 
against the agreed level of availability specified in the contract. If the OEMs fail to achieve the agreed 
level, then the OEMs are subject to a penalty which is also predefined in the contract. 
 Availability and capability of assets usually depends on the asset health and the OEM’s service 
capability. For example, an asset can be rarely available if it often fails and maintenance service 
engineers take long time to recover it. OEMs often can estimate the contract price structure based on 
this information. 
 In a service contract, asset usage or operating conditions are usually clearly specified. For 
instance, an aircraft service contract specifies that the aircrafts can fly up to 140 hours per month 
(BAE Systems 2010) or a photocopier service contract  defines that the photocopiers will be used 
between 9am - 5pm (Xerox, 2010). Besides the asset usage, the scope of OEM’s services must be 
agreed in the contracts. For example, Pratt & Whitney is responsible for supplying spare parts of 
CFM56-3 aero-engines to Jet2 (Pratt and Whitney, 2009), while Rolls-Royce provides spare and 
ground supports to RB199 engines including health monitoring capability for the UK Royal Air Force 
(Rolls-Royce, 2010).   
3 CASE DESCRIPTION 
To illustrate how modelling and simulation can be used to better understand the implications of 
service contracts, a case study was conducted at a ship building company. For confidentiality reason, 
the case company is referred to as ShipCo hereafter. The figures used and presented in the 
experimentation section have been normalised. Despite this, being anonymous allows the discussion 
of the findings to be carried out in a more openly manner without necessarily obliterating the key 
ideas and accuracy of results.  
ShipCo operates its main business in the area of military ship building and provides through-life 
supports to the customers. There are three types of service contracts offering by ShipCo: after-sales, 
leasing and output-based contracts. Leasing contracts guarantee availability of ships for a long period 
contract (25 years), whilst after-sales and output-based contracts incorporate spares, maintenance, and 
technical supports at the customers’ cost, and generally involves 5 years of commitment. The output-
based contracts differ from the after-sale contracts as their ships are built specifically for each 
customer from a given set of requirements whereas those ships in the after-sale type have already 
been designed and made by ShipCo.   
In this study, the model was developed only for the leasing-type service contract. ShipCo initiated 
leasing contracts approximately five years ago and estimates the risks and rewards based on the 
failure patterns of individual subsystems using spreadsheet. In the case that the actual cost exceeds the 
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estimation, the company renegotiates with the customers for extra payments. ShipCo leases a fleet of 
ships to its customers based on an agreed available days in a month and also rents the fleet to 
commercial customers on a short-term basis. The payment is made on monthly basis and considered 
from the actual available days of a ship in relation to the agreed level. Operating condition is 
predefined in the forms of location in which the ships will operate, for example, 80% operating in the 
UK and 20% outside the UK. However, these numbers as well as the target availability level can be 
renegotiated during the contract delivery phase. There has been no case of early termination.  
A ship is made of several heterogeneous subsystems which influence the maintenance schedule. 
Once maintenance is required, maintenance service engineers have the flexibility and autonomy to 
perform the appropriate services. The number of engineers can be adjusted in correspondence with the 
desired target utilisation of the ship. When the asset utilisation is low, ShipCo may have short-term 
contracts with commercial customers to increase ship utilisation. In case of excessive demands, the 
OEM may outsource service activities. 
4 THE SIMULATION MODEL 
Using the Agent-based Modelling paradigm, a simulation model has been developed to assist ShipCo 
in understanding implications of a leasing contract in terms of risks and rewards. An agent can be 
simple, in which its interactions with other agents can lead to different model behaviours, as well as 
complex where its autonomy and adaptability are embedded in decision rules. The agent-based 
paradigm was applied in this study due to the following reasons: 
 The decision hierarchy and interactions between agents are highlighted in an agent model, which 
align with a key characteristic of service contracts that the manufacturer and the ships (which 
imply customers in this model) have their usual tasks that cannot be interfered by the others but 
the parties can interact on the servicing basis. 
 A ship fails as a result of subsystem’s condition and these subsystems have significant differences 
in life time and service cost. Maintenance activities are also triggered by individual subsystems. 
Agent structure allows these characteristics to be modelled easily. 
 Staff productivity is crucial to contract performances and adaptable in this case, where the agent 
adaptability can potentially describe the situation. 
 Composite and simple states in an agent model enable emergent events to interfere in the agent’s 
usual function easily. For instance, a ship operates according to an operating schedule, yet, an 
accident can interfere in the operation and leads to an unplanned maintenance service.    
 The structure of the model is shown in Figure 1. In the model, a Ship agent represents asset 
operation during the leasing period, whilst an OEM agent provides the Ship agent (assets) with 
service supports. A number of Ship agents can communicate with the OEM agent to enable 
connections between asset operations and the OEM’s maintenance/servicing activities. These two 
functions are independent from one another and also can co-exist without one another. However, the 
Ship agent’s behaviour depends on its key components (represented as Part agent). Similarly, the 
OEM’s capability to sustain the contracts is influenced by the maintenance engineers.   
 
 
Figure 1 Model Structure 
 
 The actual agent-based model is implemented using Anylogic®, shown in Figure 2. Anylogic® is 
a multi-paradigm simulation modelling tool which enables SD, DES, and ABS to be applied 
simultaneously based on simple drag and drop operations. The time unit in this model is in days. The 
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main model describes an OEM that provides ship leasing contracts. These ships can also be rented out 
to other customers on a short-term basis if they are not being used by the contracted customers. Users 
of the model can adjust the rate of occurrence of this short-term demands at any time during the 
model execution by moving the slider of ST_Demand e.g. 5 ships a day.  
 The ship model presents each ship’s state which could be ‘not ready’ or ‘ready’ for operations, 
signalled by its Part agents and OEM agent respectively. Within the Ready state, it can be ‘in 
operations’ or ‘waiting’ for an operation, represented by the Operating and Idle states respectively. 
The composite state enables emergent events to interfere in the simple states as mention earlier. The 
operations are signalled by both short-term and contracted demands, hence, the two transitions to the 
Operating state. Once an operation is completed, the ship becomes Idle, triggered by a timeout 
transition. If not ready, the ship is assumed to be ‘under service’ by the OEM or subcontractor. The 
OEM shall outsource maintenance services if the maintenance staff are not available, therefore, the 
ship is triggered to WithOther from WithOEM by the OEM agent. The recovery period is estimated 
and input in the timeout transition inside the WithOther state. Upon service completion, a signal is 
sent from the OEM agent to transfer the ship to the Ready state. This model also records monthly 
performance of each ship in terms of achieved availability level, cost, revenue and penalty, throughout 
the contract. Users can interactively change the contract prices/charges, operating condition and 
agreed available days in a month during model execution (these changes imply contract 
renegotiation). It is assumed that each ship has three key components (e.g. vessels, controllers, gears), 
and each component has 3 replications (e.g. 3 vessels).  
 The spare part model looks into each Part agent’s behaviour, dictated by lifetime, failures, and 
incurred service costs. Users can interactively change these values, implying the design changes of the 
ship. The ship needs maintenance if one of its components or spare parts has no remaining useful life 
(governed by Schedule) or simply fails randomly (controlled by NonSchedule). However, once the 
ship is under the maintenance service, the OEM may decide whether or not to replace other degrading 
parts as well. This decision, denoted as ChangeLikelyhood, depends on the remaining useful life of 
the part.  
Within the OEM model, risks and rewards from signing the service contracts are monitored in 
terms of total service cost, revenue, and penalty. The OEM capability can also be evaluated based on 
the recovery performance (dictated by Turnaround time histogram) and the ship’s state throughout the 
contract period. The OEM agent assigns jobs to the maintenance team with the fewest jobs in-hand. It 
is assumed that all the required jobs can be completed by the team. Users can adjust the number of 
teams during the model execution using the buttons (implying the capability of the OEMs to adjust its 
capacity - so called adaptive capacity).  
The staff model captures the difference amongst teams of maintenance staff in terms of sequence 
in performing services and their levels of productivity. For the sake of simplifying the concept, only 
two maintenance tasks are modelled in this study. Once the team receives a job order from the OEM 
agent, the job is registered in Asset. The team can adapt their levels of productivity depending on this 
workload, in other words, the team can speed up the job when the baseline level is exceeded (for 
example, when there are more than two ships in hand). This mechanism can be captured in the 
timeout transitions from the two activity states, which adjust actual durations from the standard cycle 
times and the number of jobs in Asset in comparison with a baseline level (two jobs in this example). 
Users can also interactively change the standard activity’s cycle time as required. Once completed, the 
ship is in a ‘ready-to-work’ state. 
The outputs to this model are linked with the risks and rewards in the ship leasing contracts and 
respond to their requirements. These include monthly ship’s availability, revenue, total service costs, 
total penalty, and recovery period. An analysis of these outputs can provide several benefits, 
demonstrated in the next section.  
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Figure 2 ShipCo Model 
 
5 EXPERIMENTATION 
Having built the model, it was sent to the OEM for validation. The feedback revealed its capability in 
capturing the issues involved in service contracts and its contribution in designing the contracts. 
Along with the model, three experiments were conducted and presented to the OEM as part of the 
validation as well as to demonstrate its practical use.  
 Experiment A aims to illustrate the pricing provision based on the total service cost of a contract, 
which can be estimated from the usage requirement in the contract and product functionality. The 
OEM can use this information to decide appropriate pricing structure of a contract. 
 Experiment B aims to visualise the impacts from contract renegotiation during the contract 
period. The OEM can use the model to understand this risk and prepare a contingency plan for it. 
 Experiment C aims to evaluate the financial benefits of a marketing strategy. The outcome can 
enable the OEM to decide whether or not to employ the strategy prior to implementation. 
5.1 Experiment A 
This situation deals with an estimation of the potential maintenance cost of a ship, based on the usage 
and life information of the critical components. The ship is required to operate 70% in UK and 30% 
elsewhere at the price of $300000 per month for a 30-years contract term. In this example, the life-
time of the three critical components are approximately 500, 800 and 1000 operations, and their 
associated replacement costs are estimated at $0.5 million, $1 million and $1.5 million per part per 
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replacement respectively. The ship is expected to be available for the military customer 10 days in a 
month, and its initial production cost is $50 million. 
 To analyse this, the OpCon slider in the ship model was set to 0.43 (i.e. 30/70), the ReqAvail 
slider was moved to 10, the Life slider of the Part1 models was set to around 500 and their ServCost 
sliders were set to around 0.5. The given values were also assigned to the Part2 and Part3 models. 
The result is shown in Figure 3. 
After executing the model, the ship can be available for the 10-days availability requirement 
almost every month. This means the OEM can mostly recover the ship within 20 days. The 
accumulated cost throughout the contract becomes $12 million. The revenue has an initial negative 
value to account for the production cost of the ship that the OEM needs to invest under the leasing-
type contract. The company starts to gain profit after 15 years and will finally achieve up to $50 
million. Based on this result, the monthly contract price may also be further adjusted to obtain a 
desirable cash flow pattern.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The Results from Experiment A. 
5.2 Experiment B 
In this experiment, the OEM would like to assess the impacts if the customer will renegotiate the 
contract from Experiment A, e.g. to operate 50% in UK and 50% outside UK at year 11. Both 
experiments have 10 contracted ships. 
To do this, the model was run until the simulation time reached around 4000 simulation time. 
Then, the model was paused and the OpCon slider in the ship model was changed to 1 (i.e. 50/50). 
The model was then continued until the end of simulation and the result was contrasted against the 
normal situation with no condition change (i.e. Experiment A). The outputs are shown in Figure 4. 
The outputs reveal that the change can lead to a substantial poorer availability performance of this 
contract, double the cost and ten-time increase in penalty charge. There would be six occasions that 
the OEM cannot recover the ship within 20 days period. This means that subsystems are degraded 
significantly quicker than the original requirement. To improve the ship’s availability, the OEM may 
need to invest in the design and development of subsystem’s life so that the time between ship’s 
failures can be extended. Alternatively, the servicing capability may need to be enhanced to shorten 
recovery period, for example, by recruiting and training new staff.  However, the change from this 
contract has no significant financial impact on the OEM as a whole because the revenue from the total 
of 10 contracts still surpasses the risk. Therefore, the OEM might handle the renegotiation at no 
additional cost. 
 
 
% M$ 
Days 
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(a) Impact on Contract Performance 
 
 
 
 
(b) Overall Impact on OEM  
 
Figure 4 The Results from Experiment B 
 
5.3 Experiment C 
In this experiment, the OEM may evaluate if a discount of $0.1 million per month per ship can be 
offered to the contracted customer on the condition that the ships will be also used by other short-term 
customers at the rate of 5 ships per day.  
To set up this experiment, the ST_Demand slider in the main model was set to 5, and the 
ContractPrice slider on all ship models were set to 0.2 (since the default setting is at $0.3 million). 
The experiment was carried out in comparison to the default setting (i.e. Experiment A) and the 
outcomes are presented in Figure 5.  
% M$ 
Days 
% 
M$ 
Days 
Days 
M$ 
Days 
M$ 
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According to Figure 5, the graph of ship’s state reveals that the ship utilisation increases 
substantially with the addition of short-term rentals. The time plot of financial status also 
demonstrates that even if there is no significant revenue change but penalty and maintenance costs are 
rising as a result of the increase in utilisation. Thus, this offer should not be implemented unless the 
OEM can offer the short-term rentals at a higher price. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 The Results from Experiment C 
 
In addition to these examples, users can adjust other inputs which involve the number of 
maintenance teams, penalty cost, activity’s cycle time, number of contracted ships, part’s random 
failures, agreed available days, staff’s adaptive capability, chances of opportunity fixing, the number 
of major components and all the uncertainties subject to these inputs. 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a simulation approach that can assist the OEMs to assess and 
ultimately understand the risks and rewards prior to committing a long term service contract with their 
customers by using a simulation model. The model is based on Agent-based Simulation and in order 
to demonstrate the practical implications, a case study of a ship building has been conducted. The 
model was subsequently built following the business scenarios at the case company.  
 The model consists of Ship agents, Part agents, OEM agent, and Staff agents. The Ship agents 
describe in-service states which relate to asset operations and maintenance, dictated by their 
subsystem’s behaviour. The Subsystem agents encapsulate random failures and scheduled 
maintenance depicted by their individual failure patterns. The OEM agent captures overall contract 
and service performances as well as job allocation to staff while the Staff agents detail service 
operations. The agent structure captures OEM-customer relationship during the in-service phase via 
signalled message between the OEM and Ship agents. Similarly, impacts from subsystems on a ship 
can be investigated easily by embedding Subsystem agents inside Ship agent. Furthermore, Staff 
agents enable adaptive productivity, flexible capacity, and decision hierarchy within the OEM to be 
effectively presented. Finally, the composite state inside Ship agents allows random failures to 
interfere in their operations conveniently.    
 Three examples are presented to demonstrate how to use the model for supporting decision 
making. The experiments revealed the model’s capability in estimating the costs based on usage and 
M$ 
Days 
M$ 
Days 
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subsystem information, enabling the contract renegotiation and future provision of marketing strategy. 
A number of implications can be drawn in terms of the model’s capability: 
 Impacts of any possible risks or any deviation from the plan during the contract delivery phase 
can be visualised prior to committing the contractual agreement.  
 The input values can be changed at any time during the model runs, thus the model can capture 
contract modifications as well as market sensitivity and operational changes after the contract is 
executed. 
 Users do not need to repeat several experiments to gain more reliable results as the agents can be 
replicated to imply multiple experiments. In other words, additional sets of agents in the model 
can be added to represent different model runs. 
 On the other hand, users can change the inputs (for example, availability requirements) in some 
Ship agents and compare the result with other Ship agents. This enables comparison between 
contracts to be proceeded.  
 Users can visualise performances of both individual contract and the whole system 
simultaneously in one experiment. 
Sensitivity analysis has not been conducted in this paper as the real values of inputs are not 
publically accessible. This means the analysis would only provide understandings of model behaviour 
but not contribute to a robust solution for the OEM. Therefore, it is excluded in this study. Future 
work can be focused on embedding techniques such as cost analysis and optimisation. Overall, the 
approach has been proven to successfully assist the OEM to better understand the implications of 
service contracts in product-service businesses. 
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